Jammertest 2026 where GPSs lose their minds

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A Norwegian rescue helicopter and a small plane took off over Andøya in 2024, but the paths recorded by satellite navigation receivers showed a different picture. On the tracking screens, the helicopter appeared to make a series of tight, overlapping turns. The plane appeared to form sharp, unnatural patterns in the air. Neither depiction reflected the actual flight path of the two vessels. jammertestno

The fake routes were created as part of the “Jammertest” exercise, an annual Norwegian exercise that tests how equipment reacts when satellite navigation signals are interfered with or altered.

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The event, which takes place on the island of Andøya —about 300 kilometers north of the Arctic Circle— brings together engineers, public agencies and companies that use Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS).

The exercise, scheduled for mid-September this year, has taken on greater significance as actual satellite jamming has intensified due to Russia’s war in Ukraine. A Royal Air Force (RAF) aircraft experienced GPS jamming near the Russian border in May. In September 2025, the Swedish Transport Agency reported that it was experiencing jamming on a daily basis. Also in June 2026, experts warned that Russian satellites were emitting jamming signals, temporarily disrupting GPS signals across Europe.

The aviation industry is the most obvious example of the problem, as the impacts are immediately visible. However, interference in GNSS systems can affect areas far beyond the cockpit of an aircraft or the screen of a map. Satellite networks, such as GPS, provide not only location data but also extremely accurate time information. This timing supports communications networks, electrical grids, transportation systems and financial markets, where systems must remain synchronized.

The Jammertest exercise focuses on the possibility that a receiver will lose the signal or — most worryingly — accept a false signal. Signal interference (jamming) “drowns” the real signal, making it impossible for the receiver to use it. Spoofing involves sending a stronger, fake signal that can be used to record an incorrect location or time.

This distinction is important for infrastructure managers. A sudden loss of satellite data can be detected quickly, At the 2024 event, Harald Hauglin, chief engineer for time and frequency metrology at the Norwegian Metrology Service, and his team demonstrated that signal spoofing can be a slowly evolving hazard. They gradually increased the strength of a spoofing signal over a period of about 40 minutes. As the deceptive signal grew stronger, the display on a map shifted the reported location of the test point away from its true location, towards the Norwegian Sea.

The positioning error was easily visible. Measuring the effect on time, however, requires a different setup. The team compared a GNSS-synchronized clock, which was exposed to interference, with a reference clock connected via fiber optic to a receiver outside the test area. The difference between the two was recorded in nanoseconds, revealing how a corrupted signal can gradually drift a clock away from the correct time.

This is a particular problem for systems that use a common clock for their operation. An electrical grid or a mobile phone network can continue to operate for some time after the loss of the GNSS signal, but its ability to do so depends on the quality of its backup equipment. Local clocks, individual time references, and fiber optic links can maintain timing accuracy, although their construction and maintenance involve additional costs.

The most difficult scenario is a signal spoof that goes unnoticed. Instead of forcing the system to use its backup equipment, the spoof signal could continue to feed the system with incorrect data. Over time, this will cause a wider synchronization problem in interconnected networks.

The Jammertest event aims to identify these vulnerabilities before they manifest as an actual disruption. Participants test commercial and industrial receivers in an open environment and then share the results with the rest of the attendees. This approach differs from the more tightly controlled US military tests, where information about the exercises is more limited.